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Anna M. Cienciala
Preface
This article is based on a paper presented at the Conference “Reflections on
Polish Foreign Policy” sponsored by the East Central European Center, Columbia
University, New York, and the Józef Piłsudski Institute for Research in the Modern
History of Poland, New York, held at the Center on November 17, 2005. The
proceedings were published jointly by the Institute and Center in 2007.
Please note the author’s corrections.
p. 89, par. 2, end of line 2, after Baltic States add: Bessarabia (now Moldova) and
Northern Bukovina (now part of Ukraine).
p. 92, end of par. from p. 91, should read: ...in an offensive which began on 6
December, the day before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor...
p. 92, par. 2, line 11, should read: covered the families of Polish Army
officers...and various others, whose men folk were arrested and sent to jails or
special camps,...
p. 92, line 15, omit: as well as the families of all the above.
p. 97, line 7 from bottom should read: ...estimated that seven to ten million
3,940,000 Ukrainians died...
p. 101, line 2, after April 1942, add: – when the Germans had clearly lost the
Battle of Moscow –
p. 105, par. 1, end of line 4 should read: ...he visited the Polish (Anders) Army
then stationed in...
p. 116, line 2 from bottom after with, add: Jan S.
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p. 125, end of note 1, add after: ibid; on the Polish-Soviet negotiations at Riga, see
Jerzy Borzęcki, The Soviet-Polish Peace of 1921 and the Creation of Interwar
Europe (New Haven and London, 2008).
p. 125, Note 3, line 6, after special camps add: and NKVD prisons
p. 125, Note 3, last 2 lines should read: (New Haven and London, 2007, reprint
2009).
p. 125, Note 4, bottom line should read: Ianuaria...Augusta
p. 126, Note 7, after doc. 672, add: Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on
Foreign Policy, Vol. III, 1933-1941 (Oxford, London, New York, Toronto, 1953), pp.
380-382.
p. 127, Note 10, end, add: expanded edition, 2002.
p. 128, Note 16, line 4, after doc. 15 add: see also Cienciala, "General Sikorski.”
p. 131, Note 26, end, add: see also Robert Szymczak, "General Władysław Sikorski
and the Allies: Analysis and Prescription for Victory, 1942" in Poland and Europe:
Historical Dimensions, Vol. 1: Selected Essays from the Fiftieth Anniversary
International Congress of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America, M.
B. Biskupski and James S. Pula, eds., East European Monographs, No. CCCXC,
Columbia University Press, 1993.
p. 133, Note 40, line 1 should read: t. V,...
p. 133, Note 41, line 2, at end add: Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For the President:
Personal and Secret Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C.
Bullitt (Boston, 1972), pp. 576-599, and...
p. 133, Note 43, at end add: The general’s remains were reburied in Wawel Castle
Cathedral, Kraków, in 1993. Due to renewed controversy over the cause of death,
an examination of the remains in 2008 found that no bomb explosion took place
in the plane before it crashed into the sea, and death resulted from mortal injury
sustained in the crash.
REFLECTIONS ON 
POLISH FOREIGN POLICY 
Proceedings from a Conference sponsored by the 
East Central European Center 
Columbia University 
and the 
Józef Piłsudski Institute 
for Research in the Modern History of Poland 
17 November 2005 
Columbia University 
School of International and Public Affairs 
420 West 118 t h St. 
New York City 
Edited by 
John S. Micgiel Piotr S. Wandycz 
4 
The Foreign Policy of the Polish Government-in-Exlle, 1939-
1945: Political and Military Realities versus Polish 
Psychological Reality. 
Anna M. Cienciała 
The Polish government­in­exile, the legal successor of the prewar 
government, was established in France on 30 September 1939 (in Paris, 
then Angers) with Władysław Raczkiewicz as president and General 
Władysław Sikorski as premier, and soon commander­in­chief of Polish 
armed forces. There was also a "Rada Narodowa" (National Council), a 
surrogate parliament with an advisory role, made up of the four main 
prewar opposition parties: the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL­Polish 
Peasant Party), the Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (PPS­Polish Socialist 
Party), the Stronnictwo Narodowe, (ND­National Democratic Party) the 
Stronnictwo Pracy (Labor Party), and non­party representatives of Silesian 
Poles, Polish Jews, and others. The government and National Council 
moved to London after the fall of France in June 1940. Their main goal 
was, of course, the restoration of Poland as an independent state within its 
prewar boundaries, but also with some gains at German expense in the 
north and west (Gdańsk-Danzig, plus hopefully East Prussia and Opole-
Oppeln Silesia). The insurmountable difficulty proved to be the restoration 
of the prewar Polish-Soviet frontier as established by the Treaty of Riga, 
which followed the Polish-Soviet War, won by the Poles in August 1920; 
it was signed by Polish and Soviet diplomats in the Latvian capital on 18 
March 18 1921 and recognized by the great powers on 15 March 1923. 1 
After the Soviet attack on Poland in mid-September 1939, eastern 
Poland was incorporated in the Soviet Union, as were the Baltic States in 
summer 1940. Following the German attack on the USSR on 22 June 
1941, the Soviet dictator, Joseph Stalin, insisted on British and American 
recognition of the Soviet Union ' s western frontier as it was in 1939-1941, 
so the Polish government tried to secure British and American support for 
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its goal of restoring the prewar frontier of 1921. This paper will discuss 
the efforts of the Polish government to this end; to safeguard Polish 
independence within the context of Soviet territorial and political 
demands; also British and American policies on these issues, and the 
opposition of the majority of Poles to the Soviet demands. 
Some background is necessary for those unfamiliar with Polish 
and Soviet history. It is general knowledge that the Germans attacked 
Poland on 1 September 1939, and that this led Poland ' s allies, Britain and 
France, to enter into a state of war with Germany on 3 September ­ though 
without giving military aid to Poland. But it is not widely known that the 
USSR jo ined the Germans in attacking Poland when the Red Army 
entered Polish eastern territories on 17 September 1939, thus breaking all 
Soviet treaties concluded with the Polish government. The official Soviet 
note, handed to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow Wacław Grzybowski at 
3 a.m. that day, proclaimed that Poland had lost all her industrial regions 
and Warsaw was no longer the capital of Poland (although it did not 
surrender to the Germans until 27 September). The Soviet note also 
claimed that the Polish government had collapsed and gave no sign of life 
(although it was still in Poland, stationed on the Polish­Romanian 
frontier). This, stated the note, signified that the Polish state no longer 
existed; hence the treaties concluded by the USSR and Poland were no 
longer valid. The note continued that since Poland was now subject to all 
kinds of underhand deals and surprises which could threaten the USSR, 
the latter could no longer remain neutral. In particular, it could not be 
indifferent to the fate of its blood brothers, the Ukrainians and 
Belorussians of Poland, who were defenseless. Therefore, the Soviet 
government had instructed the High Command of the Red Army to order 
its troops to cross the frontier to protect the lives and property of the 
population of Ukraine and Belarus. At the same t ime, the Soviet 
government intended to help liberate the Poles from the unfortunate war 
into which they had been thrown by their insane leaders, and give them a 
chance for a peaceful, better life. This note, along with the assurance that 
the Soviet Union would continue its policy of neutrality toward their 
countries, was sent to all foreign diplomatic representatives in Moscow. 
The Red Army met only with some instances of strong resistance 
since most Polish troops had been moved west to fight the Germans. 
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Furthermore, many Polish military surrendered either because they had 
learned of the order issued by the Polish Commander­in­Chief, Marshal 
Edward Rydz-Śmigły, not to fight the Soviets except in self defense and to 
make their way to Romania or Hungary, or because they were misled by 
the friendly declarations of the incoming Soviet troops. Thus, the Red 
Army took three to four hundred thousand prisoners, including about 
10,000 officers. Most of the rank and file soldiers were allowed to go 
home if they lived in eastern Poland, while some were exchanged for 
soldiers of Belorussian and Ukrainian nationality taken prisoner by the 
Germans. However, Polish officers and policemen were sent to three 
special N K V D camps: Kozelsk near Smolensk; Starobelsk near Kharkov 
(Kharkiv); and Ostashkov near Kalinin (Tver). The first two were officer 
camps, while the third held police, gendarmes, some legal personnel, and a 
few army officers. 3 
Contrary to the hypocritical statements of the Soviet note of 17 
September, the Red A r m y ' s attack on Poland implemented the Secret 
Protocol of the Nazi­Soviet Non­Aggression Pact signed in Moscow by 
German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Soviet Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav M. Molotov on the night of 23­24 August 
1939. The Secret Protocol divided Polish territory down the middle 
between Germany and the USSR; it also recognized dominant Soviet 
influence in the Baltic States. The deal was illustrated a month later in a 
map published the Soviet newspaper, Izvestia showing the demarcation 
line between German and Soviet armies in Poland. 4 (This was the first 
Ribbentrop­Molotov Line; the second, which is generally referred to by 
that name, was established on 28 September, see below.) Of course, the 
Soviet newspaper made no reference to the Secret Protocol, whose 
existence all Soviet governments denied until late December 1989, when it 
was stated that verified copies had been found in the archives. It was 
condemned by a vote of the freely elected Soviet Congress of People 's 
Deputies . 5 
The first German­Soviet division of Poland was replaced by a 
second in the "German­Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty" signed in 
Moscow on 28 September 1939. Stalin then gave up some of his Polish 
territory in return for dominant influence in almost all of Lithuania ­ and 
later agreed to pay $7,500,000 dollars for an additional district. 6 On 29 
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September 1939, Pravda published a map showing this second line, 
calling it "the Frontier between Mutual German and Soviet State Interests 
on the Territory of the Former Polish State." This was the second 
Ribbentrop­Molotov Line, which always appears on historical maps, while 
the first is generally omitted. This second line, resembling the old eastern 
border of Russian Poland (except for Białystok which had been in Russia), 
plus former East Galicia, remained the Soviet­German border until the 
German attack on Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Furthermore, a Soviet­
Lithuanian treaty signed on 10 October 1939, awarded the city and region 
of Wilno (Vilnius) to Lithuania. 7 The Germans were now that much nearer 
to Moscow. Indeed, in June­July 1941 it took theni ten days to overrun 
former eastern Poland and Lithuania, with Latvia and Estonia following 
fast behind. They drove deep into the USSR, only halting in the suburbs of 
the Soviet capital. They were stopped in their tracks by severe winter 
weather and then pushed back by General, later Marshal , Georgii K. 
Zhukov, in an offensive which began o n ? December 1941 ­ the day on 
which Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, bringing the United States into the 
war. 
Meanwhile , German and Soviet terror reigned in Poland, where 
each occupant arrested, jai led, and murdered Poles. The Germans sought 
out and murdered members of the Polish intelligentsia. As is well known, 
they persecuted the Jews. They also expelled about one and half million 
Poles from western Poland, annexed to the Reich, deporting them to 
central Poland which they named the "General Gouvernement ." 8 By war ' s 
end, they also deported about two million Poles for forced labor in the 
Reich. The Soviets, for their part, deported to the "Gulag" (Labor Camps), 
or to "Special Sett lements" in the Soviet interior, people they classified as 
a "Sotsialno Opasny Element" (Socially Dangerous Element) . This term 
covered Polish army officers, policemen, politicians, lawyers, 
administrators, government officials, landowners, military settlers, 
foresters, business owners, teachers, priests, clerks and various others, 
including so­called wealthy peasants called "kulaks" who owned not only 
land but also a horse or a cow, as well as the families of all the above. The 
number of people deported in three large waves in 1940­1941 varies from 
the N K V D figure of 320,000, which is too low, to the Polish government­
in­exile figure of about 1,500,000, which is too high, but probably 
included people arrested and then jai led in the Soviet interior, army 
92 
conscripts, voluntary workers, and refugees who fled ahead of the 
Germans in summer 1941 . 9 Though most of the deportees were ethnic 
Poles, they also included Ukrainians and Belorussians, mostly politicians, 
priests and teachers. There were also many Jewish deportees from eastern 
Poland. These numbered about one third of the total Jewish population of 
prewar Poland, which was 3,136,000 according to the Polish 1931 census, 
and one third of the estimated total of 3,351,000 in August 1939. (For the 
Jews of eastern Poland, see below). 
In late October 1939, Soviet authorities held "elect ions" to national 
assemblies in western Ukraine and western Belarusia, in which people 
could vote only for officially listed candidates; Vyacheslav M. Molotov, 
was a candidate in more than one district, as was Komandarm (General) 
Semyon K. Timoshenko, commander of the Ukrainian Front in September 
1939 . 1 0 The national assemblies then requested the inclusion of their 
territories in the Soviet Ukrainian and Soviet Belorussian Republics. Their 
requests were "granted" by the Supreme Soviet (Council of Deputies) in 
early November 1939, which also "granted" Soviet citizenship to all their 
inhabitants at the end of the month. The Polish government protested both 
the Soviet aggression and the Soviet measures that followed. 1 1 At the same 
time, it authorized Polish officers in the underground in German­occupied 
Poland to organize an underground movement in eastern Poland, where 
they were ordered to organize resistance but prevent any untimely armed 
protests and uprisings. Unlike the underground in German­occupied 
Poland, however, the one in thć Soviet Poland was quickly penetrated by 
the N K V D / w h i c h arrested its leaders and most of its m e m b e r s . 1 2 
With the German attack on the USSR on 22 June 1941, the Soviet 
Union automatically became a member of the anti-German alliance, 
signing agreements with the British, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav 
governments-in-exile. The British government pressed for a Polish-Soviet 
agreement, which was also desired by General Sikorski and his supporters 
even at the cost of shelving the demand for Soviet recognition of the 
prewar frontier. For this very reason, the agreement was strongly opposed 
by the Polish president and some ministers. Sikorski, however, took it on 
himself to proceed. Thus, on 30 July 1941, after negotiations with the 
Soviet Ambassador to Britain, Ivan Maisky, mediated by British Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden, Sikorski and Maisky signed an agreement re-
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establishing Polish­Soviet relations. The Soviet government recognized 
that the Soviet­German treaties of 1939 on territorial changes in Poland 
had lost their validity. This formula was credited by Eden to Sikorski, 
although the agreement was actually worked out by the British 
Ambassador to the USSR, Sir Stafford Cripps, and Molotov in Moscow. 
It was a compromise between the original Polish demand for Soviet 
recognition of the interwar Polish­Soviet frontier and the original Soviet 
stance on an independent Polish state "within the limits of Polish 
nationality," i.e. without its prewar eastern territories. Moreover, Moscow 
had proposed setting up a Polish "National Commit tee" and army in the 
USSR. 
In the final agreement, signed in the Foreign Office in the presence 
of British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and Anthony Eden, the 
Soviet government also agreed to the raising of a Polish army on its 
territory under a Polish commander , but subordinated operationally to the 
Soviet supreme command. Left unsaid was the fact that this army would 
be raised from Polish prisoners of war and deportees. But how was Stalin 
to agree to their release without admitting they had been illegally held by 
Soviet authorities? The solution was spelled out in the Protocol to the 
agreement in which the Soviet government granted an "amnes ty" to Polish 
citizens in the U S S R who were deprived of their freedom. In fact, the 
word amnesty was suggested to Józef Retinger, Sikorski 's chief adviser at 
that time and briefly Polish charge d'affaires in Moscow, by General 
Marian Kukiel, then commander of the Polish Corps in Scotland, who 
informed him of the amnesty clause in the Polish­Soviet Riga Treaty of 18 
March 1 9 2 1 , 1 3 Retinger passed this on to Ambassador Cripps, and thus the 
word "Amnes ty" opened the way to the release of thousands of Poles to 
join the Polish Army in the USSR, led by General Władysław A n d e r s . 1 4 
The Sikorski­Maisky agreement met with strong opposition within 
the Polish government. Three ministers resigned in protest against the lack 
of specific Soviet recognition of the Soviet­Polish prewar frontier: the 
National Democrat Marian Seyda, Minister of Congressional (postwar) 
Affairs, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, then in charge of the" armed 
resistance in Poland, and Foreign Minister August Zaleski (Polish foreign 
minister in 1926­1932). President Raczkiewicz shared their point of view; 
he tried and failed to prevent the signing of the agreement but decided to 
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stay on as president . 1 5 Sikorski accepted the lack of Soviet recognition of 
the former Polish­Soviet frontier because he knew the compromise 
formula was the best he could get. Also, and above all, he wanted to raise 
a Polish army in the USSR, believing it would play an important role in 
restoring Poland within its prewar boundaries, though with some additions 
in the north and west. Indeed, he envisaged the Polish western frontier on 
the Oder­Neisse river line, and proposed it to the British in 1940 within 
the framework of a Polish­Czechoslovak confederation, which was to be 
the core of an East Central European federation designed to prevent future 
German or Soviet/Russian domination of the region. In 1939­1940, he had 
also indicated to the British that if the Polish prewar eastern frontier could 
not be restored, Poland might, within the context of such a federation, be 
compensated with German territory. Unfortunately, neither the smaller 
Polish­Czechoslovak nor the larger federation had any chance of being 
formed. The Poles and Czechs could not agree on the future of the western 
part of the Cieszyn­Tesin­Teschen region, which the Poles call Zaolzie 
(This was preponderantly Polish­speaking territory beyond the Olza river; 
the Czechs seized it in early 1919, and the Poles annexed it after the Czech 
acceptance of the Munich agreement of 29 September 1938). Furthermore, 
the Czechs would not sign any confederation or federation agreements 
with Poland unless the latter pursued a policy friendly to the USSR, that 
is, if it agreed to give up its eastern territories to the Soviet Union . 1 6 The 
British government supported projects for East Central and South­Eastern 
European federations, but could not secure Soviet agreement without U.S. 
support, which was lacking. Indeed, when Stalin opposed these projects, 
neither Great Britain nor the United States was willing to risk losing the 
Soviet Union ' s major input into the war with Germany, and later with 
Japan, the latter being of primary importance to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. 
It did not take Stalin long to make his views known to the British 
government, for he put them to Eden in mid­December 1941 (see below). 
He formulated Soviet territorial demands as a return to the "Curzon Line," 
which is often presented in western history books as the most reasonable 
Polish­Soviet frontier, both from the ethnic point of view and as necessary 
for Soviet security against further attacks from the West. Hence, it is 
necessary to give a brief outline of the history and course of the Curzon 
Line. It is also important to know what populations lived east of the line in 
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what was prewar Poland, because the general wart ime view in Britain and 
the U.S. was that they were either preponderantly Russian, or at least had a 
vast majority of non-Poles who wanted union with the USSR. Russian 
and western historians generally agree with the above views today. 
The "Curzon Line" was named for Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, 
British Foreign Secretary in 1919-1924, who signed the note proposing it 
to the Soviet government as an armistice line between Polish and Soviet 
armies. It was proposed by the British - but not supported by the French -
at an Allied meeting in Spa, Belgium, on 10 July 1920. The "Curzon 
Line" was not new; it was based on a demarcation line between Polish and 
Russian administrations proposed by experts during the Paris Peace 
Conference and then by the great powers ' representatives in the Supreme 
Council on 8 December 1919. The Curzon line separated preponderantly 
Polish territory in the West from preponderantly non-Polish territory in the 
East. In the central part, it more or less followed the old eastern frontier of 
Russian Poland, but then put most of East Galicia, which had never 
belonged to Russia, on the Soviet side. This part of the Curzon Line was 
drawn up in the Foreign Office, and was quite different from that accepted 
the day before by the Polish government delegation at Spa. Here, the Poles 
had agreed to an armistice along the current Polish-Soviet frontline in East 
Galicia, which would have left L w ó w (now Lviv) and the oil fields south-
west of the city on the Polish side. In any case, the Soviet government 
rejected the Curzon Line, sent on 11 July because, as Lenin admitted at a 
closed session of the party conference in September 1920, the Soviet 
leadership then planned to make Poland a Soviet republic and thus 
overthrow the whole "Versailles system." He also thought of setting up 
Soviet republics throughout East Central Europe, and of carrying the 
revolution into Germany and perhaps Italy as we l l . 1 7 As it happened, Józef 
Pilsudski 's victory over the Red Army in August-September 1920 - aided 
by Polish cryptographers breaking Red Army codes - led to the Riga 
Treaty and the Polish-Soviet border established the re . 1 8 
As mentioned above, the often cited justification of the Curzon 
Line is that the population' of prewar eastern Poland was preponderantly 
non-Polish, i.e. Ukrainian and Belorussian. Since, however, most western 
historians know very little about the demographic make-up of these 
territories, a few figures might be useful. According to the Polish census 
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of 1931, the total population of the country was 32,248,000, of whom 
22,281,000 gave Polish as their mother-tongue; those speaking primarily 
Ukrainian and Ruthenian (Ukrainians of Volhynia) numbered 4,468,000; 
Belorussian, 966,000; and German, 765,000. According to 1941 figures 
produced by Polish experts for the Polish government in London, the total 
population of Poland according to mother tongue as of 31 August 1939 
was estimated at 35,339,000 (according to religion the numbers were 
slightly different). Of this figure, those speaking Polish were estimated at 
24,388,000; those speaking Ukrainian and Ruthenian (also Ukrainian) at 
4,890,000; White Ruthenian (Belorussian) at 1,127,000; German at 
803,000; and those speaking Yiddish and Hebrew at 2,916,000. (The 
figure for those professing the Mosaic religion was, however, estimated at 
3,351,000). Out of the estimated 13,199,000 population in Soviet-
occupied eastern Poland as of 31 August 1939, the breakdown by mother-
tongue was: Polish, 5,274,000 (perhaps on the high side); 1,109,000 
Yiddish and Hebrew (but 1,309,000 by Mosaic religion); 4,529,000 
Ukrainians and Ruthenians (the figure was probably too low); 1,123,000 
White Russians (Belorussians), plus other small minori t ies . 1 9 Thus, while 
most of the population living east of the Curzon Line was not Polish, the 
region contained a significant Polish population with majority Polish 
districts in the north-east and south-east. In particular, the cities of Wilno 
(now Vilnius) and Lwów (now Lviv) then had predominantly Polish 
populations and were important centers of Polish cul ture . 2 0 If genuine 
self-determination had been applied in 1921, Poland ' s eastern territories 
would have been divided between the Polish state on one side, and 
Ukrainian and Belorussian states on the other. But such a solution was 
impossible in the circumstances of the t ime, so the territory was divided 
between Poland and the USSR. We should also keep in mind that while 
the west Ukrainians and west Belorussians suffered discrimination in 
interwar Poland, the fate of their brethren was much worse in the USSR. It 
is estimated that seven to ten million Ukrainians died in Stalin 's man-
made famine of 1932s,,,which he used to break peasant resistance to forced 
collectivization. Furthermore, millions of Soviet citizens of various 
nationalities perished in the Stalin Terror years of 1935-1938, as well as in 
the Stalinist repressions following World War II. 
As mentioned earlier, Stalin first put his demands to British 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in their talks on an Anglo-Soviet alliance 
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held in Moscow between 15­22 December 1941. He then stated his key 
condition for signing an alliance with Great Britain: British recognition of 
the Soviet western borders of 1941, that is, eastern Poland, the Baltic 
States, territory taken from Finland after the Winter War of 1939­1940, 
plus Bukovina and Bessarabia, then part of Romania. As for Poland, he 
said he would accept the Curzon Line with some small modifications in 
Poland 's favor. One variant of the new frontier would leave Białystok and 
Wilno in Poland, while the other would leave it Białystok and Lwów. He 
also spoke of compensating the Poles with the western part of East 
Prussia, but the USSR would get the eastern part, with Konigsberg (later 
Kaliningrad). He even suggested that Poland 's western frontier should be 
on the Oder River. However, he indicated that the Polish­Soviet frontier 
could be settled by the Soviet and Polish governments, while insisting on 
British recognition of other Soviet gains, especially the Baltic States, 
which Eden personally found acceptable, but not possible to include in the 
treaty. It should also be noted that Stalin proposed a division of postwar 
Europe into British and Soviet spheres of influence. Churchill rejected 
these proposals at the t ime, noting they were contrary to the Atlantic 
Charter. He then stated that frontier questions must be settled at the peace 
conference after allied victory in the war. He would soon, however, start 
pressing the Polish government to consider accepting Soviet demands, 
while reserving territorial changes until the war was over . 2 1 
General Sikorski, who had met with Stalin in Moscow on 3­4 
December 1941 to discuss the Polish Army then being raised in the USSR, 
learned of Stalin's demands for the Baltic States and for the Curzon Line 
as the Soviet­Polish frontier from Sir Stafford Cripps, who ­ then back in 
London ­ urged him on 26 January 1942 to accept them. Sikorski ­ who 
had already sanctioned Ambassador Edward Raczyński ' s statements 
published in the Sunday Times of 11 January 1942, on postwar East 
European federations, one of which would include Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Lithuania ­ told Cripps that Lithuania was in the 
Polish sphere of influence and Poland could not abandon Polish Wilno. As 
for the Curzon Line, he said it meant pushing Poland from East to West 
"and this cannot be done without Polish consent." He warned Churchill a 
few days later against Soviet aims to dominate eastern and northern 
Europe. He also mentioned that, in a private talk, Stalin had suggested the 
Oder River to him as Poland ' s western boundary . 2 2 Stalin may well have 
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done so, although this is not mentioned in the record of this talk, held at a 
Kremlin banquet on 4 December 1941 and recorded by General Anders, 
who acted as translator. Anders did, however, note Stalin as saying that 
Poles and Russians should settle their border themselves before the Peace 
Conference, which he also mentioned in his talks with Eden. On 4 
December, Sikorski and Stalin signed a Declaration of Friendship and 
Mutual Assistance, after which the Soviet authorities made arrangements 
to arm and feed a Polish army of 96 ,000 . 2 3 (Food and equipmect 
shortages, however, along with Soviet pressure for sending the troops to 
the front as each division was ready ­ while Anders and Sikorski insisted 
on sending the whole army when r e a d y ­ led to the evacuation of the 
Polish Army from the USSR to Iran in spring­summer 1942.) 
Eden did not have the power to agree to Stalin's territorial 
demands, though he believed they should be accepted. As noted above, 
Churchill at first angrily refused to consider them. He changed his mind, 
however, after British defeats in North Africa in early 1942, were 
followed by the fall of Singapore. In the negotiations for a British­Soviet 
alliance with Molotov in London in May 1942, the Soviet commissar 
pressed hard for the inclusion of the Baltic States and Soviet gains in 
Finland, plus Bukovina and Bessarabia, in the alliance treaty. As for the 
Polish­Soviet border, Molotov said it could be settled later, but demanded 
a commitment by the British government that it would not support the 
Polish stance on the issue. When the British government turned for advice 
to Washington, Roosevelt was reported as thinking that the Baltic States 
could be conceded to Russia, but deciding to hew to the Atlantic Charter 
provisions of no frontier changes in wartime and none without the consent 
of the inhabi tants . 2 4 Sikorski energetically lobbied the British government 
against agreement to Soviet demands. He told Churchill on 11 March that 
Poland would not accept any territorial losses to the USSR, and that the 
cession of the Baltic States to the Soviets would mean the encirclement of 
Poland. 2 5 Sikorski also warned President Roosevelt on 24 March that year . 
­ during his second visit to the United States ­ that the British were readyj 
to agree to Soviet demands for the Baltic States, as well as Romanian^ 
provinces neighboring Poland (Bukovina and Bessarabia), though Polish! 
territory was excluded. He stated that the Polish government opposed; 
these demands, and that in this matter it had the support of the whole j 
country. He said that if such negotiations did take place, Poland w o u l d ; 
99 
demand the right to participate. The general had the great satisfaction of 
hearing the President say that he completely agreed. Roosevelt said that 
he kept the Atlantic Declaration (Charter) in mind, and that after Germany 
was defeated, it would be disarmed, so there would be no German threat to 
Russia. Territorial questions would be tackled after the w a r . 2 6 
Sikorski 's opposition to Soviet demands was shared by the 
majority of Poles who insisted on the restoration of the prewar eastern 
territories and identified them with Polish independence. For example, the 
founding meeting of the Association of the North-Eastern Lands of the 
Polish Republic on 31 October 1942 proclaimed: "Standing guard over 
Wilno, Grodno, Nowogródek, or Pińsk - we are by the same token 
defending the freedom of our countrymen in all parts of Poland; we are 
defending the independence of all of Poland from the Baltic to the 
Carpathians, and from Polesie to Silesia ." In German-occupied Poland, 
the Armia Krajowa (AK-Home Army) High C o m m a n d ' s Biuletyn 
Informacyjny (Information Bulletin) of 26 November that year stated that 
Poland was destined to stem the German tide eastwards and to the whole 
world - as well as stem the pressure of the "Powers of the East" and 
eastern culture westward . 2 7 As it happened, Stalin shelved the frontier 
problem for the time being by instructing Molotov to give up the demand 
for the recognition of the 1941 Soviet western border in the Anglo-Soviet 
alliance treaty. On 24 May, Stalin cabled him to desist, saying that 
security matters (frontiers) would be settled by force. Thus, the alliance 
treaty was signed the next day without any territorial clauses. It is possible 
that Stalin 's instruction to Molotov resulted not only from official U.S. 
opposition to agreements on territorial changes during the war, but also 
because he wanted an allied invasion of Western Europe to take place in 
1942 and wished to avoid any obstacles to this end. Indeed, when Molotov 
visited Washington, President Roosevelt instructed General George C. 
Marshall to tell him that the Allies expected to open a second front in 
Europe that year, a promise that Churchill had refused to g ive . 2 8 
Sikorski believed that the signing of the British-Soviet alliance 
without the recogni t ion 'o f the Soviet western frontiers of 1941 was a 
victory for his government. He also took Roosevel t ' s assurances at face 
value, not realizing that the President 's effusive declarations of support for 
Poland and the Atlantic Charter were made with an eye to Polish-
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American voters, while his own thoughts proceeded in quite another 
direction. Indeed, in late April 1942, Roosevelt confided to Assistant 
Secretary of State Adolf Berle that he would not mind if Stalin got eastern 
Poland, the Baltics and Besssarabia, but he could not say so openly for 
fear of alienating Polish-American and Baltic-American voters . 2 9 As for 
Churchill, we should bear in mind that all post-1920 British governments 
had always considered the Curzon Line as the best possible Polish-Soviet 
frontier, justifying it on the grounds of Soviet security and the ethnic 
makeup of the population, while outside informed government circles 
most people believed that eastern Poland was populated with Russians. 
Indeed, the British government had been very careful to guarantee Polish 
independence but not Polish frontiers in 1939, and saw eastern Poland as a 
bargaining counter with the Soviets to bring them over to the British side. 
In a speech made on 1 October 1939, Churchill - then First Lord of the 
Admiralty in Neville Chamberla in 's government - justified the Soviet 
invasion of eastern Poland as setting up a second front against Germany. 
Lord Halifax, then Foreign Secretary, made a "historical" reference to the 
Curzon Line in the House of Lords on 26 October that year. Furthermore, 
the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps managed to 
persuade his government to offer the Soviets "de facto" recognition of 
their conquests in the fall of 1940 to detach the USSR from Germany, but 
Stalin did not take the bai t . 3 0 Thus, Churchil l ' s rejection of Stalin's 
demands in January 1942 was an aberration, while two factors prevented 
him from publicizing his ensuing support of Soviet demands: (a) to avoid 
a mutiny in the Polish armed units in the Middle East, (which, led by 
General Anders, moved from the U S S R to Iran in summer 1942, and 
thence to Iraq and Palestine, where they were reorganized into the Polish 
2nd Corps in the British 8th Army) , and (b) the well known support for the 
independence of the Baltic States and Finland by a group of members of 
parliament (MPs), also the support of the Roman Catholic Church and 
press, as well as a vocal group of MPs, for the restoration of an 
independent Poland within its prewar frontiers. 
British pressure on the Polish government to recognize the Curzon 
Line as the postwar Polish-Soviet frontier began in earnest after the Soviet 
victory at Stalingrad in early February 1943, although pro-Soviet 
sentiments had been dominant in Britain for some t ime. 3 1 It increased 
exponentially after Stalin broke off or "suspended" relations with Polish 
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government in late April that year. (The Russia word: prervats, like its 
Polish equivalent, przerwać, can be interpreted either way.) The root cause 
was the Polish government ' s refusal to accept the Soviet charge of 
German guilt for the massacre of Polish officers in Katyn Forest, near 
Smolensk, in spring 1940, and the Polish request for an investigation by 
the International Red Cross, which the Soviet government treated as 
collaboration with the enemy. The remains of some four thousand officers 
taken prisoner by the Soviets in September 1939 ­ who, along with about 
eleven thousand other prisoners known to have been in three special 
camps, all trace of w h o m had disappeared in spring 1940 ­ were 
discovered by the Germans in March 1943. Berlin radio publicized the 
gruesome find on 13 April, charging the Soviets with the crime, to which 
the Soviets replied two days later by accusing the Germans. The Polish 
government, under great pressure from Polish opinion at home and abroad, 
especially the army, replied in a communique by the Minister of Defense, 
General Kukieł on 16 April, though Churchill had advised against it. 
Kukiel detailed the numbers of Polish prisoners of war held in three 
camps, Kozelsk, near Smolensk, Starobelsk, near Kharkov, and 
Ostashkov, near Kalinin (Tver), and the existing information about their 
departure from these camps in Apri l­May 1940. (The information was 
based on survivor accounts). Kukiel also listed Polish inquiries to Soviet 
authorities about the missing prisoners from these camps, and the stock 
answer received that they had all been released, but without any 
information as to their whereabouts. Furthermore, the Polish government 
requested an International Red Cross (IRC) investigation of the 
massacre . 3 2 
As it happened, the German Red Cross made the same request to 
the IRC at almost same t ime (both made on 15 April) , and the requests 
were repeated formally by the Polish and German governments two days 
later. Despite a conciliatory Polish government statement denying the 
Germans the right to use the Katyn crime for their own defense, there was 
a full scale Soviet attack on the Polish government in a Pravda article on 
19 April, titled "Hit ler 's polish Collaborators." Stalin wrote Churchill two 
days later that the Polish government ' s attitude had led the Soviet 
government to "interrupt" relations with the Poles. Eden proceeded to tell 
Sikorski on 24 April that Stalin was willing not to break off relations if the 
Polish government retracted its request for an IRC investigation, blamed 
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the Germans for the Katyn massacre, and dropped "anti­Soviet" ministers. 
Eden advised acceptance of these demands for the good of the Allied 
cause, also to secure Stalin 's consent to the departure of tens of thousands 
of Poles, including children, from the USSR. Sikorski said that he could 
not accept these demands . 3 3 On 25 April, Molotov summoned Tadeusz 
Romer, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, and read him a note breaking 
off relations. The Soviet government accused the Polish government of 
collusion with the "fascist slander" over Katyn, as well as making use of 
the German charges of Soviet guilt in a "hostile campaign" to pressure the 
Soviet government into making territorial concessions at the expense of 
Soviet Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania ­ a reference to the Polish stand on 
the inviolability of the interwar Polish­Soviet frontier. 3 4 
Here we should note that the vast majority of the Polish troops who 
had left the USSR with General Anders for Iran and were then stationed in 
Iraq and Palestine, came from eastern Poland. They were particularly 
outraged by the news of the Katyn massacre, where many of their 
comrades­in­arms had perished. Like most Poles, they believed in Soviet 
guilt for the Katyn crime. This belief was expressed in the Polish press 
both at home and abroad, so the Polish government had to take some 
act ion. 3 5 W e also know that Stalin had prepared the ground for breaking 
off relations with the Polish government two months earlier with the 
Soviet note on 16 January 1943, stating that all persons living in western 
Ukraine and western Belorussia in November 1939 were Soviet citizens. 
This was not only an open Soviet claim to these territories; it also meant 
that no more Poles could leave the USSR to jo in the Polish army in the 
Middle East, thus allowing the conscription of those still in the Soviet 
Union into a new, communist­led army. Moreover, unbeknownst to the 
British and Polish governments, Stalin discussed breaking off relations 
with the Polish government well before the Katyn massacre became 
known. In early February 1943, as the Germans were surrendering in 
Stalingrad, he told Wanda Wasilewska ­ the leader of a group of Polish 
communists and left­wing socialists in the USSR and secretly a member of 
Ukrainian Communist Party ­ that a new Polish center in the Soviet Union 
was needed (i.e. to replace the Polish Embassy). They "agreed" to form 
the Związek Patriotów w ZSSR (ZPP - The Union of Polish Patriots in the 
USSR), which would publish a new Polish newspaper, Wolna Polska 
(Free Poland). Thus the Polish government ' s reactions to the Katyn 
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massacre simply provided Stalin with the pretext to break off relations and 
openly acknowledge the ZPP, soon followed by the formation of a new 
Polish army raised from former Polish P O W s and deportees who had not 
managed to jo in the Anders army. Thus, the "Kościuszko Division," was 
formed in M a y 1943, led by former Colonel, now General, Zygmunt 
Berling, who, along with some sixty other Starobelsk officers had escaped 
death by declaring willingness to cooperate with the Soviet U n i o n . 3 6 
Churchill now bent his efforts to restore Polish-Soviet relations and 
pinned his hopes on Sikorski. He greatly valued the general for signing the 
Soviet-Polish agreement of 30 July 1941, and knew that he sincerely 
desired the renewal of Polish-Soviet relations. It is unlikely, however, that 
the British prime minister knew of Sikorski 's instruction of 23 November 
1941 to General Stefan Rowecki , the commander of Pohsh underground 
forces in Poland~~united in the Armia Krajowa in 1942^ to prepare for 
taking over the Polish eastern territories as the Red Army came in, and to 
fight it if necessary . 3 7 This was modified in early March 1942 by orders 
for the A K to cooperate with the Red Army against the Germans - but also 
to dispatch significant Polish forces to Wilno and Lwów. The AK, 
however, was ordered not to be the first to take up arms against the 
Russians, for this would be seen as Polish collaboration with the Germans. 
These were followed by further orders in early February and late on 23 
March 1943. In February, Sikorski wrote that he hoped to secure western 
support for the Polish interwar eastern frontier, but in the worst case 
scenario, the AK was to carry out an uprising in the east, taking over 
military and political power with priority given to Wilno and Lwów. In 
March, however, Sikorski wrote Rowecki, that in case of open Soviet 
hostility, only the civilian administration should come out from the 
underground, while the AK was to retreat into the Polish interior to protect 
itself from destruct ion. 3 8 It is worth noting that this order followed the 
Polish government ' s declaration of 25 February 1943, rejecting Soviet 
accusations that it wanted the Polish eastern boundaries to stand on the 
Dnepr [Dnieper] and the Black Sea, but also declaring that it stood by the 
inviolability of the Polish prewar eastern frontier. 3 9 
Sikorski once again sought support from President Roosevelt. He 
made a third trip to the United States in December 1942-January 1943 and 
received declarations of support for an independent Poland from the 
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President. Indeed, Roosevelt wrote him a letter, dated 5 January 1943, 
assuring him that the U.S. government was determined that Poland should 
be restored, as implied in article 3 of the Atlantic Charter and the 
Declaration of the United Nations, both of which excluded territorial 
changes in wartime and changes without the agreement of the 
inhabi tants . 4 0 Sikorski did not know that the President rejected the advice 
of William C. Bullitt, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow (1933-1936), 
who warned Roosevelt in January 1943 of Stalin's aims to dominate 
Eastern Europe and proposed an allied invasion of the Black Sea and 
Balkans region rather than France, before the Red Army arrived there. 
Bullitt also suggested granting or withholding reconstruction aid to the 
USSR in order to ensure the establishment of postwar democratic 
governments in the region. The President, however, told Bullitt that Stalin 
"was not an imperialist but a friend and ally" who would work with him 
"for a world of democracy and peace." Thus, it is not surprising that 
Roosevelt agreed with Eden, who visited Washington in March 1943, that 
Stalin should get eastern Poland up to the Curzon Line, while Poland 
would be compensated with East Prussia. When Eden said that Poland 
would want to have her original boundaries, Roosevelt replied that "the 
big powers would have to decide what Poland should have, and that he, 
the President, did not intend to go to the Peace Conference and bargain 
with Poland or the other small states; as far as Poland is concerned, the 
important thing is to set it up in a way that will help maintain the peace of 
the wor ld . " 4 1 
Sikorski wanted to travel to Moscow to talk with Stalin, although 
we do not know what he planned to offer the Soviet dictator. It is most 
unlikely, however, that he would have agreed to make any territorial 
concessions to the USSR. In May-June 1943 he visited the Polish Army in 
Iraq because of significant unrest in its ranks. Discontent and anger were 
voiced at Sikorski 's allegedly conciliatory policy towards Moscow, and 
General Anders had even demanded that the government resign. Sikorski 
managed to quell the unrest by making patriotic speeches and granting 
promotions in rank. Now, however, disturbing information arrived from in 
Poland. The views of the AK High Command were expressed by General 
Rowecki in a cable he sent to Sikorski in three parts on 19 June 1943; it 
was read by the Polish General Staf fs Dept. VI (Dept. for Underground 
Affairs) on 19 and 22 June, and must have reached Sikorski when he was 
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still in the Middle East. Rowecki wrote that he planned partisan warfare 
against both the Germans and the Soviets, who were equally mortal 
enemies of Poland. A K conflict with the Soviets as they came in, wrote 
Rowecki, could only be averted by the Western Powers ' guarantees of 
Polish independence, territorial integrity, and the recognition of Polish 
civilian and military authorities on the whole territory of operations. He 
proposed diversionary action in the east, that is, delaying the march of 
Russian armies by destroying communications up to and including the 
Vistula and San rivers; fighting the Soviets where there were even 
minimal chances of doing so; and where there was no such chance, 
leaving A K armed forces hidden, ready to act against Russia (sic) at the 
appropriate moment on the orders of the commander­in­chief . 4 2 
W e do not know Sikorski 's reaction to this cable; perhaps he 
discussed it with General Tadeusz Klimecki, chief of the Polish General 
Staff, traveling with him. Whatever the case may be, Sikorski, his 
daughter Zofia Leśniewska, General Klimecki, Major Victor Cazalet, 
M.P., the British liaison officer to Sikorski, a courier jus t arrived at 
Gibraltar from Poland and others in the party, all died in a plane crash off 
Gibraltar on 4 July 1943; only the Czech pilot, Edward Max Prchal, 
survived. The cause of the crash remains unresolved to this day; contrary 
to the British investigation's report, it may have been the result of 
sabotage . 4 3 Sikorski 's body was transported to Great Britain and given a 
state funeral in Westminster Cathedral. Churchill wept when told of his 
death and spoke highly of him. In a radio speech to the Polish people on 6 
July, he praised Sikorski and appealed for unity in the war effort. In a 
speech in the House of Commons on 16 July, the British Prime Minister 
stated: "He was a man of remarkable pre­eminence, both as a statesman 
and a soldier." On hearing of the general 's death, Alexander Cadogan, the 
British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote "This is a great 
blow: there 's no-one to take his place." William Strang, the Assistant 
Secretary of State, told General Kukiel that the British government 
considered Sikorski to be a great statesman, the most outstanding of all 
those whom the war had driven off the European cont inent . 4 4 Their 
opinion of General Sikorski would surely have been different if they had 
known of his orders to Rowecki . 
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Sikorski was succeeded as Premier by Stanisław Mikołajczyk, the 
emigre leader of the largest Polish political party, the Polish Peasant Party. 
Also, despite Eden ' s objections, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski became 
commander­in­chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the West, as well as of 
the AK in Poland. Sosnkowski opposed any negotiations with the USSR 
and was thus a critic of the new Polish Prime Minister who believed that 
negotiations must take place, though he continued to hew to previous 
Polish policy. Thus, Mikołajczyk stated at a press conference in London 
on 16 July 1943 that his government would continue Sikorski 's policy of 
establishing a Central­European federation, together with preparations for 
a South­Eastern European Federation. He also stressed his government 's 
desire for good neighborly relations with Soviet Russia, and for peaceful 
cooperation among the nations of postwar Europe, with all benefiting from 
President Roosevelt ' s Four Freedoms . 4 5 At the same t ime, like Sikorski, 
he looked for support from the U. S. president. 
Mikołajczyk seemed to have good grounds for hope. Officially, 
the U.S. government continued to follow the line that no territorial 
changes were to be made during the war, and none without the consent of 
the populations involved. This was the official policy which aimed not 
only to maintain support for the war by the general American public, but 
also to secure Polish­American and Baltic­American votes for the 
Democratic Party. Privately, however, Roosevelt made it known in spring 
and summer 1943 to Soviet ambassador Maxim Litvinov and his successor 
Andrei Gromyko, that he would not object if the Soviet Union took over 
the eastern territories of Poland and the Baltic states by a "fait accompli ," 
though he could not say so publicly in view of Polish­American and 
Baltic­American voters . 4 6 This covert U.S. policy was also reflected in 
military planning. At the first Anglo­American Quebec Conference, code­
named "Quadrant" and held on 17­24 August 1943, it was decided that 
Eastern Europe was to be a Soviet war theater, signifying that it might be 
written off as a Soviet sphere of influence. The underlying American ­
though not British ­ assumption for this policy was that the U.S. primary 
goal should be to secure Soviet aid in the war with Japan; therefore, Soviet 
demands concerning Central and Eastern Europe must be met. Indeed, the 
President seemed to agree with the view expressed by Major General J. H. 
Burns that much of Europe would come under Soviet domination at the 
end of the war, which was also the view of the Joint Strategic Survey 
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Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 4 7 Indeed, in September 1943, 
Roosevelt told the Archbishop of New York, later Cardinal Francis 
Spellman ­ his favorite Roman Catholic bishop ­ that most of Eastern 
Europe as well as Austria would probably have communist governments, 
while the French communists might accept a "Popular Front" or socialist 
government (which existed in 1936­37) . 4 8 Also in September 1943, 
Colonel Leon Mitkiewicz, the deputy chief of the Polish General Staff and 
its representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, reported 
advice from high British and American officers that any Polish uprising 
against the Germans must be coordinated with the Sovie ts . 4 9 
Thus, it is not surprising that at the first "Big Three" Conference, 
held in Tehran between 28 November­2 December 1943, where plans 
were discussed for an allied invasion of France coordinated with a Soviet 
offensive in the east, Churchill proposed to Stalin that Poland be moved 
west, "like a soldier taking three steps left close," and illustrated this with 
matches. (He was, in fact, reproducing Stalin 's proposal to Eden of 
December 1941). Roosevelt told Stalin that he generally agreed with 
moving Poland west, also with including the Baltic States in the USSR, 
but could not say this openly because of the presidential election coming 
up in November 1944. He hoped there would be some sort of referendum 
by the inhabitants of the Baltic States. Stalin understood the President 's 
problem, but said there could be no international supervision of the 
referendum. He also said that while Poland could have East Prussia, he 
wanted the port of Kónigsberg (which he had also demanded in talks with 
Eden in December 1941). At the end of the conference, it was understood 
that Poland would be compensated with German territory in East Prussia, 
as well as unspecified German lands in the West, and ­ what was most 
important for Roosevelt ­ Stalin declared his willingness to enter the war 
against Japan after the end of the war in E u r o p e . 5 0 It is worth noting that 
the map of Poland studied at Tehran to review the course of the Curzon 
Line, was drawn up in the Office of the Geographer of the Department of 
State in conjunction with the Advisory Committee on Post­War Foreign 
Policy. On this map, Stalin drew red pencil lines showing what he wanted 
for the USSR apart from former eastern Poland, i.e. the northern part of 
East Prussia, and what he was ready to give up to Poland east of the 
Curzon Line, i.e. Białystok province, plus a bulge of territory between 
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Brest­Litovsk and Chełm, and a fragment of East Galicia including the 
city of Przemyśl . 5 1 
After his return to London, Churchill told Mikołajczyk on 20 
January 1944 what he thought was reasonable for the Poles to accept, i.e. 
the Curzon Line ­ but not that it had been agreed as the Polish­Soviet 
frontier at Tehran. He told the Polish Premier of Stalin 's proposal that 
Poland receive East Prussia ­ but did not mention that it would be minus 
Koenigsberg and the northern part of the province ­ as well as a Polish 
western frontier on the Oder river. Mikołajczyk replied that Polish 
frontiers could not be settled without negotiations and the consent of the 
Polish people. He also said that his position would be impossible unless he 
could tell his people that Poland would emerge from the war 
undiminished. On 6 February 1944, he told the British Prime Minister that 
he could not publicly announce his acceptance of the Curzon Line. He said 
that what he and his government were defending was Polish 
independence. Churchill questioned Poland 's right to Vilna (Wilno) ­
whose seizure in October 1920 was condemned by the British 
government, but not to Lwów, though he said it lay in predominantly 
Ukrainian territory, and he insisted that he was fighting for Poland ' s very 
life. After several more meetings with Mikołajczyk, Foreign Minister 
Tadeusz Romer and Ambassador Edward Raczyński, the Polish Premier 
told Churchill on 16 February that the Polish Cabinet accepted the text of 
a message that Churchill would send to Stalin. The Polish Cabinet agreed 
to a demarcation line running east of Wilno and Lwów, with a Polish 
administration west of the line and with representatives of the United 
[western] Powers assisting Soviet military authorities east of the line. The 
Polish Cabinet opposed the attribution of Konigsberg to Soviet Russia. 
Churchill, however, wrote the Soviet leader on 21 February that the Polish 
government was ready to declare that the Riga line (1921) "no longer 
corresponded to realities" ­ which was not in the text approved by the 
Poles ­ and that it was ready to discuss a new frontier with the Soviet 
government as part of a general settlement. However, since any public 
statement to this effect would be repudiated by the Polish people, such a 
settlement could only be agreed at the conclusion of an armistice or 
peace, so the Polish government proposed a demarcation line between 
Polish and Soviet administrations. Churchill wrote that the Polish 
government was anxious that the districts under their administration would 
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include Vilna and Lvov (Russian spelling), though he knew that Stalin 
would not agree. He also informed Stalin of the Polish government orders 
for Polish military and civil authorities to cooperate with Soviet 
commander s . 5 2 On the next day, Churchill made a speech in the House of 
Commons proposing the Curzon Line as the Polish­Soviet frontier and 
compensating the Poles with German territory as the best solution for 
Poland. He also said, however , that all territorial settlements should await 
the end of the war, when the victorious powers would reach agreements 
regarding Europe as a w h o l e . 5 3 Stalin sent an angry telegram to Churchill 
on 28 February, insisting on the immediate recognition of the Curzon Line 
by the London Poles as well as changes in the Polish government. He also 
suggested that a reconstructed Polish government might include Polish 
Americans, naming Professor [Oskar] Lange and [Father Stanisław] 
Orlemanski, a suggestion he also made to President Roosevel t . 5 4 Lange, a 
recently naturalized American citizen, was a left­wing Polish economist 
who publicly supported Soviet demands on Poland. Orlemanski was a 
Catholic priest with a parish in Springfield, Mass; he supported the 
communist­ led "Kościuszko League" which propagandized the 
Kościuszko division in the USSR. President Roosevelt allowed both of 
them to fly to the USSR in May, as "private cit izens," via Alaska. Lange 
spoke with Stalin and Molotov, also with soldiers of the Kościuszko 
Division, and interviewed Polish communist leaders, including those who 
had just arrived from German­occupied Poland . 5 5 
It should be noted that before Churchil l 's speech of 22 February, 
his proposals were communicated by the Polish government to the 
underground authorities in German­occupied Poland: the Rada Jedności 
Narodowej (RJN ­ Council of National Unity), formed in January 1944, 
and the Delegate of the Polish government. Both objected strongly. They 
wrote on 15 February that they agreed to the proposed western boundaries 
and the removal of the German inhabitants from those territories, but 
strongly objected to any discussion with the Soviets on the revision of the 
eastern boundaries. They stated: "No one in Poland would understand why 
Poland is to pay the Soviets the costs of war with her territories and her 
independence . . . Even now, the Polish people are decided to fight against 
the new Soviet aggression in defense of their own independence and for 
the freedom of Europe. The Polish nation trusts that the Allies and the 
peoples of the world will understand their attitude and will support it 
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actively." It is not surprising, therefore, that Churchil l 's speech, 
recommending the Curzon Line as the Polish­Soviet frontier, provoked 
vigorous reactions by Polish public opinion. A prominent underground 
newspaper Wiadomości Polskie, in its issue of 8 March 1944 called it a 
"Russian Munich" and stated: "The issue of our frontiers is the 
fundamental issue of our real independence, the issue of the future 
freedom of Europe, of the security of many states and peoples, not 
excluding England." The Biuletyn Informacyjny^ which spoke for the AK 
High Command, stated on 16 March: "We have no desire to facilitate 
Russian rapacity by participating in a new partition of Poland and making 
our Fatherland a small vassal state under Russian protection." These 
views were widely shared by Poles who were not members of the 
government or the underground authorities. In New York, the Polish poet 
Kazimierz Wierzyński published a long poem in Tygodnik Polski on 12 
March 1944, protesting the sacrifice of half of Poland as per the Churchill 
speech . 5 7 Even the communist Polska Partia Robotnicza (PPR ­ Polish 
Workers ' Party), which supported Soviet demands, did not come out 
publicly in favor of revising the eastern frontier. On 7 March 1944, its 
leader, Władysław Gomułka, wrote to Georgii Dimitrov (Secretary 
General of the former Comintern, who, after its official dissolution in May 
1943, earned on his work within Central Committee of the Soviet 
Communist party): "If St. Anthony 's Brotherhood came out in favor of 
revising the eastern frontier, it would immediately be denounced as a 
Soviet front organization receiving Soviet money to get the Polish nation 
under the boot of Stalin." Indeed, members of PPR­ dominated Krajowa 
Rada Narodowa (KRN ­ H o m e National Council), formed in Warsaw on 
the night of 31 December 1943­1 January 1944, who managed to reach 
Moscow in May that year, lobbied Molotov to leave Lwów and the oil 
fields in Poland, but were told to desis t . 5 8 The KRN was a front 
organization for the PPR; its first chairman was Edward Osóbka­
Morawski , followed by the Polish communist and N K V D agent, Bolesław 
Bierut, later president of Poland. 
In March 1944, Churchill tried once more to secure Stalin's assent 
to settling the Polish­Soviet frontier after the war. However, his telegram, 
sent on 21 March, informing Stalin that he would make a speech the 
House of Commons affirming British recognition of the Polish 
government and stating that all territorial changes must await the peace 
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conference, met with an angry reaction. The Soviet leader wrote that the 
Curzon Line had been approved at Tehran and he would treat the proposed 
declaration by Churchill as an unjust and unfriendly act toward the Soviet 
Union, so Churchill did not include the offending passage in his speech . 5 9 
A month later, the British government informed its Polish ally that its 
mediation effort had failed. 
In late May 1944, there were informal and secret Polish­Soviet 
talks in London, at the request of the Soviet ambassador to the Allied 
governments, Viktor Lebedev. His request was transmitted to the Poles by 
the Czechs, and the talks took place between the ambassador and 
Stanisław Grabski, chair of the Polish National Council . It so happened 
that this was also the time of the Lange­Orlemanski visit to the USSR, 
mentioned above. The Lebedev­Grabski talks were desultory until 31 
May, when Grabski proposed that Mikołajczyk travel to Moscow to reach 
agreements on the administration of Polish territories, cooperation 
between the A K and the Red Army, and discuss the principles of an 
agreement on territorial questions. Lebedev seemed to welcome these 
proposals and said he wished to meet with Mikołajczyk. On 2 June, the 
president of the Czechoslovak govemment­in­exile , Eduard Benes ­ who 
had previously presented Soviet demands to Mikołajczyk in early January 
1944 ­ communicated additional Soviet terms to Mikołajczyk: Moscow 
had "reservations" about [the inclusion in the new government of] 
Sosnkowski, Kukieł, [Stanisław] Kot and President Raczkiewicz; an 
agreement could be concluded on the administration of liberated Poland 
and cooperation between Polish and Soviet forces, while the frontier 
question could be dealt with later. Lebedev also said that "The Union of 
Polish Patriots and the Polish Communis ts would present no obstac le ." 6 0 
He asked for a meeting with Mikołajczyk, but the Polish premier declined 
because he was about to leave for the United States. It is most likely that 
Stalin wanted Mikołajczyk to jo in the new Polish government then being 
discussed in Moscow ­ in which the communists would have the majority 
along with key ministries. If the Polish premier agreed, the Peasant Party 
would not only provide majority support for that government in Poland, 
but the new government would also be welcomed with open arms by 
Roosevelt and Churchill. 
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Mikołajczyk received a red carpet welcome in the United States, 
presumably because the President wanted to counteract the condemnation 
of the Lange­Orlemanski trip to Moscow by the Polish American 
Congress, established in Boston at the end of May. The Polish premier met 
with President Roosevelt on 7 June ­ the day after Allied troops had 
landed in Normandy ­ and again on the 12th. The day before the second 
meeting, he met with Oskar Lange ­ after being pressured to do so by the 
State Department ­ and heard Stalin's views once again, with emphasis on 
the German territories that Poland was to obtain in the west ­ if it gave up 
the prewar territories in the east. On 12 June, the President advised 
Mikołajczyk to travel to Moscow and reach an agreement with Stalin, 
advising him to make changes in his government. He also told him that 
Poland would receive East Prussia and [Upper] Silesia. Furthermore, the 
President said he did not expect Stalin to insist on the Curzon Line, saying 
that he himself did not agree to the frontier being based on that line (sic). 
According to the Polish record of the conversation, Roosevelt promised 
his support "at the appropriate t ime" for the award of Lwów, Drohobycz 
[oil fields] and Tarnopol to Poland. Afterwards, however, Roosevelt 
assured Stalin that his talks with Mikołajczyk did not result in any 
decisions on Polish­Soviet relations that were contrary to the agreements 
reached at Tehran . 6 1 
After his return from the United States, Mikołajczyk had several 
meetings with Soviet Ambassador Lebedev in London. The latter 
proposed that the Polish premier go to Moscow, but also reiterated, 
although he did not press them, the Soviet demands for Cabinet changes 
and Polish agreement to the Curzon Line. The Polish premier said he 
could not agree to the removal of cabinet members , except perhaps 
Sosnkowski. He proposed reaching agreements on political and 
administrative matters before he left for Moscow, and said the frontier 
should be settled after the war. In the meanwhile, he proposed a 
demarcation line between Soviet and Polish administrations, which should 
leave territories with large numbers of Poles on the Polish side of the line. 
On 23 June, Lebedev suddenly presented Mikołajczyk with an ultimatum: 
recognize the Curzon Line as the Polish­Soviet frontier; include Poles 
from London, the USSR, the United States and the KRN in the new 
government, while dropping Sosnkowski, Kukieł, Kot and Raczkiewicz. 
This new government should condemn its predecessor for the "mis take" it 
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made on the Katyn question. Mikołajczyk answered that he had nothing to 
say and the talks broke off. 6 2 
The Lebedev ultimatum was most likely t imed to coincide with the 
massive Soviet offensive which began that day from Belarus and crossed 
the Curzon Line by the end of June. Stalin needed to know if Mikołajczyk 
might jo in the new Polish government or some kind of national committee 
controlled by Moscow to take over the administration in Polish lands west 
of the line, but he made it clear that he would not recognize the Polish 
underground 's , and thus the Polish government ' s authority east of the line. 
In early July, the Red Army accepted the help of AK units in liberating 
Wilno and L w ó w from the Germans, but then proceeded to arrest the 
officers and men. The officers who refused to jo in the Berling­led First 
Polish Army were deported to labor camps in the Soviet interior. The 
rank­and­file soldiers and N C O s were forced to jo in that army, but many 
deserted in short order. Polish civilian authorities who came out to greet 
the Soviets as hosts and take over the administration, were also arrested. 
This procedure also continued west of the Curzon Line, indicating that 
Stalin would not tolerate any rivals to the P K W N (Polish Committee of 
National Liberation). 
Mikołajczyk now came and under great pressure from both the 
British and U.S. governments to see Stalin, who issued the invitation on 
Churchil l ' s request. The Polish premier set off for Moscow on 26 July, 
but the P K W N , formed in the Soviet capital on 20 July, announced its 
existence in Chełm two days later. Here it published its manifesto ­
actually drawn up and published in Moscow ­ which spoke of a "return" 
to Poland of old Polish Pomerania, Opole/Oppeln Silesia, East Prussia, 
and of a frontier on the Oder river. As for the eastern frontier, it was to be 
settled by mutual agreement based on awarding Polish lands to Poland, 
while Ukrainian, Belorussian and Lithuanian lands would jo in the 
respective Soviet republics. There was to be a permanent Polish alliance 
with the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Justice would be meted out to 
German criminals and national traitors; there would be an agricultural 
reform on the basis of 5 hectares for every peasant household (1 hectare = 
2.47 acres), and the needs of the workers would be satisfied. There was no 
mention, of course, of collectivization, nationalization, or of the fact that 
the P K W N had already signed a treaty with the USSR establishing 
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Poland 's eastern frontier according to Soviet demands, as well as 
recognizing the primacy of Soviet military authority in liberated Poland. 
The PKWN, which soon moved to Lublin ­ and hence is often referred to 
as the Lublin Committee ­ consisted of Polish communists and left­wing 
socialists from the KRN delegation sent to Moscow and the ZPP, and 
claimed to represent the Polish peop le . 6 3 In reality, the majority of Poles 
recognized the underground authorities at home, w h o were loyal to the 
Polish government in London. 
On 25 July, just before Mikołajczyk left London for Moscow, the 
Polish government instructed General Bór­Komorowski (the successor of 
General Rowecki) , who had informed them four days earlier of the AK 
High Command ' s decision for an uprising in Warsaw, that he should 
decide when to start it. This was a new factor in Polish resistance, for 
Warsaw and other cities had been excluded from the "Burza" (Storm) 
plans for a phased, general uprising as the Germans retreated, to prevent 
destruction and loss of life. It should be noted that the Polish government 
did not instruct the AK High Command to carry out an uprising in 
Warsaw, but accepted its decision to do so. In fact, Mikołajczyk and his 
supporters in the government viewed such an uprising as an asset in the 
forthcoming Moscow negotiations, assuming that it would help the Red 
Army in taking the city, which was the road and rail communications hub 
between Moscow and Berlin. General Sosnkowski , for his part, expressed 
complete distrust of the USSR, opposed the plan for a general uprising in 
Poland, and had earlier advised the AK High Command to evacuate its 
forces from the city and make their way west, though it is not at all clear 
how they could have reached western lines. He was, however, with the 
Polish Army in Italy at the t ime of the AK High Command decision and 
its acceptance by the government, so he was unaware of these 
developments, but when the uprising broke out he gave it his full support. 
To understand the AK High Command decision, one must look at 
the situation in and around the Polish capital at this t ime. In late July, 
Warsaw was like a pressure cooker. Although Colonel Claus Schcnk'von 
Stauffenberg's 20 July attempt to assassinate Hitler had failed, it indicated 
the likelihood of more military opposition to him and the possible 
emergence of a new German government which would seek peace with 
the Allies. At this t ime, exhausted German troops were flowing west 
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through the Polish capital for the Red A r m y ' s First Belorussian Front, the 
strongest of all the Soviet fronts, had shattered the German Armee Mitte 
(Central Army) Group and was expected to reach Warsaw in a few days. It 
was unthinkable both to the AK High Command and the underground 
civilian authorities that they should do nothing but wait for the Red Army 
to come in, thus confirming Soviet propaganda that they were passively 
standing by, arms in hand, instead of fighting the Germans (subtext: they 
were waiting to fight the Soviets). In fact, they had fought the Germans 
for almost six years and believed not only that they had to liberate the 
capital themselves from the hated Germans anc£ by the same token, 
document Poland 's right to independence from the USSR. In these 
circumstances, the A K High Command decided o n . 2 1 July, with the 
agreement of the Government Delegate and the Council of National Unity, 
that an uprising should take place in Warsaw. Bór­Komorowski gave 
orders to stand by on 25 July, but revoked them as German troops began 
to return to Warsaw. Two days later, the ci ty 's German governor, Ludwig 
Fischer, ordered 100,000 people to report the next day for digging 
trenches, and Bór­Komorowski again issued an order to stand by. 
However , the German order was ignored by the people of Warsaw, so the 
AK stood down. On 29 July, gunfire was heard near the eastern part of 
Warsaw, Praga. On the next day, the Polish­language Kościuszko radio 
station in Moscow called on the people of Warsaw to rise up against the 
Germans and help the Red Army enter the city. It is known now that while 
the key PPR leaders were in Lublin with the P K W N , a PPR committee 
meeting in Warsaw decided that as soon as the Germans left and the Red 
Army and the Polish [Berling] Army came in, the PPR would take over 
the municipal administrat ion. 6 4 
Meanwhile , Mikołajczyk who had left London by air on 26 July, 
stopped over in Cairo to consult Churchill. He asked whether he should 
proceed in view of the P K W N agreement with the Soviet government to 
take over administration of liberated Polish territories. Encouraged by 
Churchill, he decided to go on to Moscow. On the same day, President 
Raczkiewicz appointed three members of the underground Council of 
National Unity, Adam Bień (Polish Peasant Party), Antoni Pajdak 
(Socialist), and Stanisław Jasiukowicz (National Democrat) as ministers in 
the Polish government, with Jankowski as Deputy Premier. (The 
appointment was retroactive to 29 March 1944). They were to make 
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themselves known to Soviet authorities when these arrived in Warsaw. On 
July 29, Mikołajczyk arrived in Moscow, accompanied by the National 
Council Chair, Stanisław Grabski, Foreign Minister Tadeusz Romer, 
Councilor Józef M. Zarański and Councilor Aleksander Mniszek ­ who 
was to act as translator ­ as well as General Stanisław Tatar, pseudonym 
"Tabor." The latter was Deputy Chief of Staff for contact with the AK and 
advocated acceptance of Soviet demands. 
To the AK High Command, the Council of National Unity and 
public opinion in Warsaw, it looked as if Mikołajczyk was about to reach 
an agreement with Stalin. Taking all the military and political 
circumstances into consideration and, in particular, the news that Soviet 
tanks were reported as approaching Praga, the AK High Command 
decided on 31 July that the uprising begin on 1 August at 5 p. m. It did 
not expect the fighting to last more than a few days, after which the Red 
Army would come in, welcomed by Polish military and civilian 
authorities. Warsaw was, after all, the main communications hub between 
Moscow and Berlin, so it was logical to assume that the Red Army would 
take it as soon as it could. Opinions were divided on what would happen 
next, but it is clear hat the AK High Command and civilian authorities did 
not expect the Soviets to stop outside Warsaw and wait for the Germans to 
put down the rising. 
Just as the Red Army was approaching Praga, however, a new 
German army group, made up of three Panzer Corps, launched a counter­
attack and threw back the Soviet 2 n d Guards Tank A r m y . 6 5 Marshals 
Zhukov and Konstantin K. Rokossovskii , the commanders of the 1st 
Belorussian Front, who had been ordered to take Praga by 8 August, were 
now ordered to take up defensive positions. In Moscow, Stalin promised 
Mikołajczyk to help the insurgents, but in saying so he probably intended 
to encourage the Polish premier to accept Soviet demands. Indeed, Stalin 
rejected Mikolajczyk's proposals ­ approved by the Polish Cabinet ­ to 
treat the Curzon Line as a demarcation line, and that the final frontier, to 
be fixed after the war, must leave all large and significant centers of Polish 
population in Poland. Furthermore, Mikolajczyk's talks with members of 
the P K W N showed the latter wanted three quarters of the seats in the 
government, which was unacceptable to the leader of the largest political 
party in Poland. He decided that further talks were useless. In any case, he 
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had told his Cabinet before leaving that he would make no commitments . 
Thus, he and his delegation left Moscow on 9 August with the task of 
informing their colleagues of Stalin 's d e m a n d s . 6 6 
Whatever Stalin 's plans may have been, a vicious Soviet press 
campaign against the London Poles ensued. Moscow blamed them for the 
outbreak of the uprising in Warsaw and denied any responsibility, while 
the Red Army paused and did not take Praga until 14 September. All the 
A K High C o m m a n d ' s efforts to establish direct or indirect contact ­ by 
radio and through the Soviet Embassy in London ­ with the Red Army 
failed. Churchill tried mightily to secure Stalin 's military aid for the 
insurgents, but the Red Air Force did not drop supplies until after the 
capture of Praga, and they were of little help since they were dropped 
without parachutes. Meanwhile , in order to support Mikołajczyk, the 
British Prime Minister mobilized public opinion in support of the 
insurgents, and asked Stalin to give landing rights to Allied planes, but he 
refused. The arms drops by low flying allied planes with Polish and allied 
crews flying from southern Italy and back, were sparse and their losses 
heavy, while the drops by the lone U.S. Air Force flight, approved by 
Stalin and made on 18 September, came from a height of 30,000 feet, so 
most landed on German­held sites in the c i ty . 6 7 
Meanwhile , after much discussion on the frontier question, the 
Polish Council of Ministers (Cabinet) approved a resolution, proposed by 
Mikołajczyk, on 22 August 1944; it was cabled to the Polish authorities 
Warsaw for consideration, along with an opposing resolution agreed by 
the leaders of the Polish Socialist Party. The government resolution, 
proposed by Mikołajczyk and voted by his supporters as text A, stated that 
"Poland would retain in the east the main centers of cultural life and raw 
materials absolutely necessary for economic life" ­ which meant giving up 
most of eastern Poland except for Wilno, Lwów, and the oilfields ­ but 
that the final settlement of the Polish­Soviet frontier would be made by the 
Constitutional Diet (parliament elected to draw up the constitution). The 
PPS leaders in London rejected this formula and produced text B stating 
that Polish frontiers would be considered after the war on the basis of 
friendly understanding between allied states. President Raczkiewicz and 
General Sosnkowski also sent their objections to text A. 
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The reaction of the political leadership in Warsaw to the 
Mikołajczyk text was negative, even though they were surrounded by 
burning and collapsing buildings. The Krajowa Rada Ministrów (Home 
Council of Ministers, executive of the RJN, the Council of National Unity) 
judged the Premier ' s interpretation and motivation of the government 
resolution as absolutely inadequate, and said they had not been informed 
of the attitude of Britain and the United States to Stalin 's demands. They 
objected to the equal treatment of the AK and the communist­led Polish 
Army in the proposal for military cooperation. They demanded that the 
government appeal to world opinion on behalf of Poland, which had been 
the first to fight the Germans, had been fighting them for five years, and 
now, when its adversaiy was falling in defeat, was expected to pay [for it] 
with its territory, its independence, and its honor. Text A was also rejected 
by the A K Commander . In his dispatch to Mikołajczyk and to the Polish 
C­in­C, General. Sosnkowski, General Bór­Komorowski called the 
proposal "a complete surrender" and said that the Poles had not fought the 
Germans for five years "for the sake of an eventual surrender to Russia." 
Bór­Komorowski expressed the feelings of the majority o f Poles, which 
explains why the Polish government­in­exile could go no further than its 
resolution of 22 August 1944, finalized in its memorandum of 29 August, 
which was also rejected by Stal in . 6 8 
During all these deliberations, the Warsaw insurgents fought on, 
supported by the population, although the people 's enthusiasm ebbed as 
the rising dragged on and supplies became scarce. The Gentians often 
killed prisoners and civilians, though this was more common at the outset 
of the rising. After waiting for Soviet assent, which did not come, the 
British and American governments finally recognized the A K soldiers as 
combatants, thus giving them protection if taken prisoner. As noted 
earlier, the Red Army took Praga on 14 September, but then stood by and 
watched. The attempt by a battalion of the Polish First People 's Army to 
land in west­bank Warsaw failed for lack of Soviet artillery cover, though 
it was clearly available. After sixty­three days of fighting, Bór­
Komorowski signed a surrender to the Germans on 2 October. Hitler then 
ordered the destruction of the city, so most buildings still standing in the 
west bank part of the city center were blown up. The estimated losses by 
the German military and AK forces were about even, but the total loss of 
Polish lives, mostly civilians, is estimated at about 250,000 and most of 
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the west bank part of Warsaw was destroyed. It is unlikely, however, that 
the capital would have been saved from destruction if there had been no 
rising, for Hitler had ordered it to be defended to the last man. The earlier 
destruction of Minsk, and later of Wrocław (Breslau), showed what 
Hitler 's orders meant for German­defended cities. 
Mikołajczyk again traveled to Moscow in mid­October, 
summoned by Churchill who had flown there to discuss the Polish 
question and the Balkans with Stalin. Mikołajczyk was subjected to 
violent tirades by the British prime minister, who desperately wanted the 
Polish premier to accept the Curzon Line as the Polish­Soviet frontier, the 
precondition for his jo ining a new Polish government acceptable to Stalin. 
For Churchill , as for Roosevelt, Mikolajczyk's inclusion as premier in 
such a government was to prove to their countries ' public opinion that the 
Poles themselves had accepted the Soviet demands, so the British and U.S. 
governments could not be accused of betraying them. It was only now that 
Mikołajczyk finally learned of the Roosevelt­Churchill­Stalin agreement 
on the Curzon Line at Tehran, as well as the award of Konigsberg and the 
northern part of East Prussia to the Soviet Union . 6 9 After much discussion, 
the Polish government in London resolved on 6 November to reject the 
Soviet demands, citing the lack of a final delimitation of Poland ' s western 
frontiers and the lack of guarantees for Poland ' s independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The British government was informed 
on the same d a y . 7 0 Indeed, the outlook for compensating Poland with 
German territory, except for Gdańsk and part of East Prussia, and for a 
British guarantee was more than dim. In a conversation on that day 
between Mikołajczyk and Foreign Minister Romer on the one hand and 
Eden and Alexander Cadogan on the other, Eden called the Polish claim 
to German lands up to the Oder river "sheer madness ." He also stood by 
the offer of a joint British­Soviet guarantee of Poland 's independence and 
frontiers, not a British guarantee as the Poles requested. 7 1 
Mikołajczyk, however, still held out for a reply from President 
Roosevelt to his appeal for support, in particular, for leaving Lwów and 
the oilfields as well as Wilno in Poland, and for a guarantee of Polish 
independence. Roosevelt answered in a letter to the Polish Premier that the 
U.S. government stood for a strong, independent Poland with the right of 
the people to order their affairs as they saw fit, but explained that the U.S. 
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government could not guarantee any specific frontiers. Informally, through 
Ambassador Harriman, he promised to intervene for Lwów, but not 
W i l n o . 7 2 In view of the above, the Polish government decided not to 
accept Roosevel t ' s informal offer, and Mikołajczyk decided to resign. He 
believed that an agreement with Moscow must be made, conceding Soviet 
demands, as this was Poland 's only chance for territorial compensation in 
the west in exchange for losses in the east. He also thought that some 
members of the Polish government in London could prevent the 
communizat ion of Poland, provided they returned there soon . 7 3 He 
believed that the western powers would ensure Polish independence and 
democratic government in Poland. Free elections were, indeed promised in 
the Yalta Conference report on Poland (where the Polish­Soviet frontier 
was fixed according to Soviet wishes, with territorial gains at German 
expense in the West to be decided later) as they were for all liberated 
countries in the Declaration on Liberated Europe, also signed at Yalta. The 
members of the new provisional Polish government were, however, to be 
chosen from candidates approved by a committee made up of Molotov, 
British Ambassador Clark­Kerr and U.S. Ambassador Harr iman. 7 4 As it 
turned out later, Molotov vetoed almost all of the candidates favored by 
the two ambassadors. 
In April 1945, Mikołajczyk accepted the Yalta agreements on 
Poland. He traveled to Moscow in June, where he negotiated his access to 
the new government, in which his party, the largest in Poland, received 
only twenty­five percent of the seats. At the same t ime, a rigged trial of 
sixteen Polish underground leaders, kidnapped by the N K V D , took place 
in the Soviet capi ta l . 7 5 H e could not, however, do anything about this. He 
jo ined the communist­dominated Polish government in late June 1945, as 
the second deputy premier and minister of Agriculture. This government 
was recognized by most states in early July. Poland obtained a frontier on 
the Oder and Western Neisse line at the Potsdam Conference of 17 July ­ 2 
August 1945. Mikołajczyk played a significant role in this decision, made 
by the great powers in exchange for the Polish provisional government ' s 
solemn promise to hold free elections as soon as poss ib le . 7 6 The elections 
held in January 1947 were not free, however, for the communist victory 
was rigged and Mikołajczyk had to flee for his life as Stalinist terror 
descended on Poland. Nevertheless, the Polish western frontier, viewed as 
provisional in 1945, to be finally delimited at a peace settlement signed 
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with Germany, soon obtained de facto recognition and was officially 
recognized in the treaties on the unification of Germany signed on 3 
October 1990. 
Most western historians criticize and often condemn the wartime 
Polish governments for insisting on the restoration of the prewar Polish 
eastern frontier, calling this policy "romant ic" or "unrealistic." This view 
can still be found in many university textbooks on modern European 
history. For example, the American historian Robert O. Paxton, states: 
"The London Poles (like many Poles at home) were determined not to 
relinquish an inch of their swollen 1921 frontier. Indeed, some of the 
London Poles had dreams of an even greater Po land . " 7 7 A British historian 
of Polish descent, Anita J. Prażmowska, states that by 1943 the Polish 
government "had ended up in the wrong place and had committed all its 
resources to the wrong a l ly . " 7 8 She implies that the right ally would have 
been the USSR; therefore, the Polish government should have consented 
to a new eastern frontier on the Curzon Line and dropped some ministers 
as dictated by Moscow. This was the theme of officially­sanctioned 
histories of Poland in World War II published in Poland until the collapse 
of communism there in 1989. It is a view also shared by some historians 
of Poland today, notably Jan M. Ciechanowski, who fought as a young 
boy in the Warsaw Uprising of 1 August 1­2 October 1944, and settled in 
Britain after the war. He has consistently claimed that the leaders of the 
Warsaw Rising ­ the A K High Command ­ should have coordinated their 
plans with the Soviet High Command; by deciding not to do so "they 
assumed heavy responsibility for the fate of Warsaw and greatly 
contributed to the ensuing tragedy of this city and its people ." They 
should, he claims, have come to terms with Stalin. "Such a 
rapprochement," writes Ciechanowski, "would have been very costly to 
Poland, but, in the second half of 1944, it was the only realistic course to 
adopt." The most damning recent Polish condemnation of the Warsaw 
Rising is a polemical study by Tomasz Łubieński, published on its sixtieth 
anniversary in 2 0 0 4 . 7 9 
What all these critics fail to note is that not only the Polish 
government­in­exile and the underground military and civilian leadership 
in German­occupied Poland, but also the vast majority of Poles at home 
and abroad, were adamant on Poland regaining the "Kresy" ­ the lands 
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east of the Curzon Line, which had been in Poland for centuries. They saw 
this region not only as an integral part of Poland, but also as necessary for 
Polish security versus the USSR and thus identified it with Polish 
independence. They were particularly attached to the former Polish cities 
of Wilno (Vilnius, now capital of Lithuania) and L w ó w (now L'viv, the 
capital city of western Ukraine), which had majority Polish populations 
before the war. Finally, they firmly believed that their demand for an 
undiminished postwar Poland was justified by their fight against the 
Germans at home and abroad, as well as guaranteed by the principles of 
the Atlantic Charter, signed by Churchill and Roosevelt in August 1941. 
In the Charter, the two leaders rejected territorial aggrandizement and 
territorial changes made without the consent of the inhabitants. They also 
proclaimed the right of all peoples to freely choose their form of 
gove rnmen t . 8 0 These principles were repeated by both the U.S. and British 
governments during the war and at the Yalta Conference, where the 
Polish­Soviet frontier was fixed on the Curzon Line ­ with a few minor 
changes in Poland 's favor ­ and where the British and U.S. leaders 
implicitly recognized Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe. 
In the light of Polish documents and press of the time, it is clear 
that if any Polish government accepted Soviet territorial and political 
demands during the war, it would have lost the support of most Poles at 
home and abroad. Since Polish public opinion refused to accept them, the 
government could not accept them either. Could it have persuaded the AK 
High Command, the Polish underground authorities, and public opinion in 
spring or summer 1944 to agree to the loss of eastern Poland and to a 
government reconstructed according to Soviet wishes, by supplying 
detailed information on allied support of Soviet policy aims? This is 
unlikely. First of all, the Polish government was never told outright that 
the British and U.S. governments agreed with Stalin; they did not do so for 
fear of a negative reaction by their own peoples. Roosevelt ­ who was 
keenly aware of the Democra ts ' need for Polish­American votes to win the 
presidential election of November 1944 ­ kept Polish hopes alive by 
various statements of support. He even denied supporting the Curzon Line, 
as he told the Mikołajczyk in June 1944, so the Polish government could 
not tell the underground authorities in Poland that American support 
against Soviet demands was not to be expected. Secondly, even when 
British preferences were made clear by Churchill in February 1944, the 
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Poles could not believe his speech presaged acceptance of Stalin's 
proposals. Thus, it is clear that any Polish government which accepted the 
Soviet demands before war ' s end would be committ ing political suicide as 
far as its own people were concerned. At the same t ime, rejection of these 
demands condemned them to losing power as far as Stalin and the Western 
Allies were concerned. 
There was no way out of this tragic dilemma. Is the Polish 
government to be condemned as romantic, and unrealistic ­ or as being in 
tune with majority Polish opinion which distrusted the Soviet Union, and 
therefore opposed agreement to its demands? It was only natural for 
Polish leaders, both at home and abroad, as well as the majority of Poles, 
to view the acceptance of Soviet territorial and political demands as 
synonymous with the loss of Polish independence. It was also natural for 
them to put their trust in the Western Democracies , which constantly 
repeated their adherence to the Atlantic Charter. As for the "realist" 
Mikołajczyk, his belief that the Western Powers would ensure the 
emergence of a democratic Poland proved to be an illusion. The powers 
condemned, but would not fight the imposition of communism in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, they chose peace and stability over 
war while looking to their own security. The communist system in Eastern 
Europe underwent some changes but lasted for almost fifty years until it 
finally collapsed in 1989, beginning with Poland, while the U S S R 
disintegrated two years later. 
Today, however, Russian imperial policies are reviving while the 
European Union ' s (EU), economic links with Russia ­ particularly 
Germany ' s ­ are growing increasingly stronger, with a growing 
dependence on Russian oil and gas. The near future will tell whether the 
EU will support its Polish, Baltic, and other eastern members in a crunch 
against Moscow, and whether the United States and other N A T O members 
will honor their military obligations to their eastern allies if the need 
arises. Let us hope that history will not repeat itself once more, this t ime in 
the shape of a Russian domination over Central and Eastern Europe 
achieved by economic instead of military means. 
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1 For the English text of the Riga Treaty of March 18, 1921, see Documents on 
Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, vol I. 1939-1945 (DPSR), edited by 
Stanisław Biegański et al, London, 1961, doc. 3; for recognition by the great 
powers: the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, see "Decision of the 
Conference of Ambassadors on the Subject of the Frontiers between Poland and 
Soviet Russia and Lithuania," 15 March 1923, ibid., doc. 4. The United States 
acknowledged the decision on 5 April 1923, note, ibid. 
2 Text of the Soviet note in French, DPSR I doc. 43; English translation, Soviet 
Documents on Foreign Policy, selected and edited by Jane Degras, vol. Ill, 1933­
1942, Oxford 1953, 374; Russian text in Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki. (DVP), 
Tom XXII. 1939 God. (Book 2). 1 Sentiabria ­ 31 Dekabria 1939 g., Moscow 
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